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I. INTRODUCTION

This Essay is something of a thought experiment. It poses the
question whether the American Revolution, its grievances against the
English crown embodied in the 1776 U.S. Declaration of
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Independence,' would be justified under modem standards of
international law. The inquiry is intended to serve as a mirror against
which Americans may judge the validity of current international norms
regarding modem secessionist movements around the globe.
Americans are taught from a young age that our own revolution was
entirely justified by the political and economic oppression of the
American colonists. What would it say, then, if the standards which the
international community now employs to judge the legitimacy of other
secessionist movements would indicate the illegitimacy of our own?
What would it say if the question was, as this Essay will argue, too
close to call? Simply, it would signal the need to rethink the standards
we, as Americans, should consider acceptable when judging the
legitimacy of foreign declarations of independence. 2
Because of the unsettled nature of whether secessionist
movements-particularly violent ones-are ever justified by current
norms and, if so, when,3 no definitive answer can be given as to whether
the American Revolution would be justified by current norms. The
question is a close one, even under an interpretation of current norms
that permits secession. And not all interpretations do.
Even the judgment regarding whether or not the American
Revolution would be considered legitimate by today's standards is a
close call that must be subject to several important historical caveats in
order to be profitable. The analysis below will first briefly discuss those
historical caveats: dark patches in American colonial history that are so
far behind now almost universally accepted principles of human rights
and self-determination that discussing them would simply not be useful
to evaluating the present norms. Those issues are then excised from the
following analysis, narrowing the historical focus of the discussion to
only those aspects of American colonial history that are useful to a
present day examination of the fairness of the international standards
1.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). It is admitted right off the bat in

this Essay that it is the author's view that the American Revolution was a legitimate act of
secession suitable for use as a yardstick against which international norms and present U.S.
policy may be measured. That fact itself is of course, open to debate in other contexts. However,
this Essay does proceed with the underlying assumption of legitimacy. In his defense, the author
is an American and cannot help himself.
2. Alternatively, it could call for a fundamental reexamination of American's selfconception as a nation founded on a legitimate revolution. Although several pieces that examine
the American Revolution through a more critical lens exist and are worthy of attention, such a
discussion goes beyond the scope of this Essay. See generally, e.g., HILLER B. ZOBEL, THE
BOSTON MASSACRE (1970) (reexamining the events surrounding the Boston Massacre).
3. See Matthew Saul, The Normative Status ofSelfDetermination in InternationalLaw:
A Formulafor Uncertainty in the Scope and Content of the Right, 11 HuM. RIGHTS L. REV. 609,
643 (2011) ("The right to self-determination is one of the most unsettled norms in international
law. This is true both of its legal content and its normative status.").
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relating to secessionist movements. Next, the Essay will discuss the two
competing international law principles which create tension with regard
to secessionist movements: a state's right to territorial integrity and a
people's right to self-determination. In an attempt to sketch out the
murky parameters of what may justify a people in an exercise of
external self-determination, or secession, two examples-Bangladesh
and Quebec-and their implications for international norms will be
discussed. Then the grievances of the American colonists will be
analyzed within the loose framework of when a secessionist movement
may be justified by current international norms. Finally, the Essay will
conclude with some observations regarding the implication of a finding
that the American Revolution would either not be justified under current
standards or that it is too close to call.

II. PARAMETERS AND

CAVEATS

The purpose of this Essay is to use the circumstances and grievances
surrounding the U.S. Declaration of Independence as a way of judging
the current international norms on external self-determination and
secession. However, the passage of time from 1776 to the present day
has seen dramatic evolution in fundamental conceptions of human rights
and legitimate forms of government. The examination of the American
colonies here, in the context of their claim of a legitimate revolution,
must be entirely historically accurate if it is to be useful to the current
endeavor. Some aspects of early American history are simply too far out
of the present day norms to do anything other than hinder the
discussion.4 Each of these issues would probably be fatal to the
American argument under current international norms.5 These issues are
slavery and suffrage, each of which will be treated very briefly now so
as to demonstrate why they must be excluded hereafter.
A. Slavery
The first and most glaringly obvious piece of colonial American
history that must be excluded from the analysis is the existence of
American slavery, not only at the time of the revolutionary war, but for
nearly a hundred years thereafter. Without putting too fine a point on it,

4. See MARGARET MOORE, NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION 2
(Margaret Moore ed., 1998) ("[M]any of the discussions of a right to secession confine
themselves to recognizing this right for groups that are prepared to abide by democratic norms,
respect liberal rules ofjustice and equal rights under the law.").
5. See id.
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international norms not only expressly condemn the practice of slavery,
but the UnitedNations Declarationon the Grantingof Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples also expressly requires that newly
independent states be granted self-governance "without any distinction
as to race, creed or colour"7 and the Declaration on Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
requires that same behavior on the part of states in respecting the selfdetermination of their inhabitants. Although the issue has never been
squarely presented-no modern state claiming a right of external selfdetermination has ever openly wished to simultaneously maintain a
fully legal and legitimized practice of human slavery 9-it is simply not
conceivable that such a state's appeal to principles of self-determination
could be, or should be, viewed as anything other than laughably
hypocritical.
Even in historical context, the American revolutionary period was
rife with the inconsistency of slavery and the principles of rights that
underlie the modern conception of external self-determination.' 0
Moreover, it was widely believed, particularly in the Americas at the
time, that the very nation from which the colonists sought freedom had
abolished domestic slavery in 1772." In 1775, after the revolutionary
6. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (111), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(111) (Dec. 10, 1948) art. 4, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ ("No
one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade are prohibited in all their
forms."); see also Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, A.T.S. 11 [1927]
U.K.T.S. No. 16 (Cmd. 2910), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1955/07/
19550707%2000-53%20AM/ChXVIII 2p.pdf (requiring the contracting parties to eliminate
the slave trade). In fact, issues surrounding race relations may have become such an important
international norm that even superpowers have bowed to the norm in order to keep international
support during the cold war. See Mary L. Didziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41
STAN. L. REv. 61, 61 (1988) ("[E]fforts to promote civil rights within the United States were
consistent with, and important to, the more central U.S. mission of fighting world
communism.").
7. G.A. Res. 1514 (1960).
8. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028, at
121 (Oct. 24, 1970).
9. This excludes practices of "slavery" that are tantamount to conscription for public
works or part of the punishment of criminal offenders. See Slavery Convention, supra note 6
(making this caveat).
10. Frederick Douglass's famous questions when asked to speak at an 1852 Fourth of
July Celebration are particularly poignant: "What have I, or those I represent, to do with your
national independence? Are the great principles of political freedom and of natural justice,
embodied in that Declaration of Independence, extended to us?" Frederick Douglass, "The
Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro", Address at Corinthian Hall (1852), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part4/4h2927t.html.
11. See Jerome Nadelshaft, The Somersett Case and Slavery: Myth, Reality, and
Repercussions, 51 J.NEGRO His. 193, 193-94 (1966).
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war had begun as a practical matter but before the U.S. Declaration of
Independence was issued, Lord Dunmore-the colonial governor of
Virginia-even issued an emancipation proclamation of sorts,
"declar[ing] all indented servants, Negroes, or others, (appertaining to
Rebels) free, that are able and willing to bear arms, they joining His
Majesty's Troops."' 2 Even so, nothing is perhaps more telling as to the
incongruity of what is now termed external self-determination with the
slave trade, even at the time of the American Revolution, as that the list
of grievances against the king contained in Thomas Jefferson's original
draft of the Declaration of Independence climaxed with a condemnation
of slavery.' 3 That portion was excised before the Declaration was
passed by the Second Continental Congress.14
If slavery were to be considered when judging the colonists' claim
for external self-determination, the answer to whether they would have
had a legitimate claim of a right to secede under modern norms would
be a very easy "no," probably without the need to look any deeper at the
situation. In order to have the analysis in this Essay be useful to
evaluate the current norms and practices, the practice of slavery in the
colonies must therefore be put aside.
B. Suffrage in the Colonies and Early States
The second aspect of American colonial independence that will be
disregarded for the purposes of this Essay is the limited availability of
voting rights in the colonies and the post-revolutionary states. Suffrage
in the colonies and the early republic was extremely limited. Only free
white men possessing property worth a particular, variable, amount
could be guaranteed a right to vote throughout the colonies and early
states. 5 For example, the original 1777 New York Constitution limited
the right to vote for the State Assembly to males "possessing a freehold
12.

BENJAMIN QUARLES, SLAVERY, REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA, AND THE NEW NATION

396 (Finkelman ed., 1989) (quoting Dunmore from the original broadside of the declaration
contained in the University of Virginia library). For additional background, see generally
WOODY HOLTON, FORCED FOUNDERS: INDIANS, DEBTORS,

SLAVES, & THE MAKING OF THE

AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN VIRGINIA (1999).
13.

DAVID ARmITAGE, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A GLOBAL HISTORY 56-59

(2007).
14. Id. In fairness to the colonists, it should be noted that there was already at that time a
significant abolitionist movement in place in the colonies and, while England was moving more
quickly in the direction of complete abolition than the colonies, that was in part because of
efforts by the King to thwart the colonial efforts. See THE ANNOTATED U.S. CONSTITUTION AND
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 94 n.27 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 2009) [hereinafter Rakove].
15. A Snapshot of Rights in the Early Republic, HERB: A SOCIAL HISTORY FOR EVERY

CLASSROOM, http://herb.ashp.cuny.edu/archive/files/votingchartf68ea95b6e.pdf
Apr. 14, 2012) [hereinafter SnapshotofRights].
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of the value of twenty pounds ... or [who] have rented a tenement [in
the county] of the yearly value of forty shillings" and who had paid their
taxes. 16 The limitation on suffrage, specifically as it related to women
and minorities, was not among the complaints of the colonists. In fact,
founding members of the revolution argued against expanded voting
rights for the young, for women, and for the poor.' 7
The effect of these voting limitations was that as of the 1790 census
it was probably the case that less than twenty-one percent of the
American population was entitled to vote.' 8 In some cases, the
availability of voting rights in the early republic actually went
backwards, stripping women of the right to vote in New York, New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New Jersey.' 9 In a modern context, such
a restricted form of suffrage would pose a hurdle to the legitimacy of a
claim to external self-determination. The restrictions based on race, and
some would argue now gender, would make it difficult for the people
seeking statehood to credibly represent that they plan to govern the
whole of their people "without any distinction as to race, creed or
colour" as required.
However, given the historical context and purpose of this Essay, it
would be best to put aside issues of suffrage in the colonies for two
reasons. First, at the time of the Declaration suffrage was extremely
limited worldwide and was not present at all in many nation-states. For
example, women's suffrage movements would not begin to proliferate
until more than a hundred years after the American Declaration of
Independence. 2 1 Second, the subsequent proliferation of suffrage and
the (arguable) coming into being of a norm regarding suffrage and
democracy can in many ways be traced back to the Declaration itself. In
the words of historian David Armitage, "the American Revolution was
16. N.Y. CONST. art. VII (1777).
17. See, e.g., Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26, 1776), in 4 PAPERS OF
JOHN ADAMS 208-13 (Robert J. Taylor et al. eds., 1977) (arguing against giving the right to vote
to women, children, and those who do not own property).
18.

SCHEDULE OF THE WHOLE NUMBER OF PERSONS WITHIN THE SEVERAL DISTRICTS OF

THE UNITED STATES, 1790 CENSUS INFORMATION, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/decennial/1790.html. The 21% is arrived at by dividing
the total number of white men over the age of 16 into the total population. It is not perfectly
accurate. It may be slightly high because it includes white men of voting age who may not meet
property qualifications. However, because of local laws expanding suffrage in this period, some
adjustment up would also be required for an entirely accurate number. See Snapshot of Rights,
supranote 15.
19.

Voting Rights History, Two Centuries of Struggle, CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT

VETERANS, http://www.crmvet.org/info/votehist.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
20. See id.; G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 7, at 67; G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 8, at 121.
21. See Women's Suffrage: A World Chronology of the Recognition of Women's Rights to
Vote and Stand for Election, INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, http://www.ipu.org/wmne/suffrage.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
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the first outbreak of a contagion of sovereignty that has swept the world
in the centuries since 1776."22 At the time, the philosophical position
espoused by the now immortal phrase "We hold these truths to be selfevident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness" was an extreme one. 23 Jeremy
Bentham, the father of utilitarianism referred to this most influential
part of the Declaration, as both "absurd and visionary," 24 declaring that
no government could exist but "at the expense of one or another of
those rights." 25 It would be more than a little unfair to judge a
movement as wanting because it does not meet the standards of its own
philosophical progeny over two hundred years later.2 6 Moreover, doing
so would tell us nothing about the present norms, which is the purpose
of this Essay.
Considering the status of suffrage within the colonies around the
time of the declaration would thus be counterproductive to the purpose
of this Essay. However, this does not mean that one of the key questions
regarding self-determination-who exactly are the people with a right
of external self-determination within the geographical area in which
they seek to now control government?-will be disregarded. 27 As it
relates to North America's indigenous peoples that concern is very
much worthy of discussion and treated in detail in Part IV.
III. NoRMs?
A. When Does a Right to External Self-DeterminationAccrue?
The issue of secession and external self-determination is one that
highlights the tension between two great principles enshrined in the
U.N. Charter: self-determination and territorial integrity. The Charter
names the principle of self-determination of peoples as a goal of the

22.
23.

ARMITAGE, supra note 13, at 103.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

24. Jeremy Bentham, Short Review of the Declaration(1776), reprinted in ARMITAGE,
supra note 13, at 173.
25. Id. at 174.
26.

See DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS:

A PROBLEM ORIENTED APPROACH 406 (2010) (discussing the impact of the political philosophy

animating the Declaration of Independence).
27. This formulation of a key question is adapted from the three questions Moore
believes to be begged by the principle of self-determination. See Moore, supra note 4, at 2.
Those questions are "1. Who are the people? 2. What is the relevant territorial unit in which they
should exercise self-determination? [and] 3. Does secession have a demonstration effect?" Id.
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organization twice.28 Multiple General Assembly resolutions
specifically address the self-determination of peoples in general and
broad brush terms. A few key ones are the Declaration
29 on the Granting
of Independence to ColonialColoialCounrie
Countries andPeoles
and Peoples, Principles Which
Should Guide Members in Determining Whether or not an Obligation
Exists to Transmit Information Called for Under Article 73e of the
Charter,30 and the Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.3 1 The International
Court of Justice has opined that-particularly in the context of
decolonization-the right of external self-determination, including
democratically based systems for determining the consent of the
peoples, is a key international norm.32 There, the court defined the
principle of self-determination as "the need to pay regard to the freely
expressed will of peoples." 33 What that means exactly is a different and
more complicated question. It is not clear that outside of the
decolonization context external self-determination is recognized as a
norm at all. 34 If it is, its contours remain unclear.3 5
The second great principle that can conceptually run contrary to selfdetermination is the prohibition of forcible action and promotion of
territorial integrity. Indeed, both the U.N. Charter 36 and the Declaration
on Principles of InternationalLaw Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations37 expressly address these principles. The latter
declaration, after laying out an express right of self-determination for
colonized peoples, then qualifies its meaning with the phrase:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as
28. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2; U.N. Charter art. 55, para 1.
29. G.A. Res. 1514, supranote 7, at 66.
30. G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), 29, U.N. Doc. A/4651 (Dec. 15, 1960).
31. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 8, at 121.
32. See Western Sahara,Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31-34 (Oct. 16).
33. Id. at 33. It is worth noting that in the same breath as coining this definition, the I.C.J.
defined one of the situations where "consulting with the inhabitants of a given territory" was
unnecessary as a situation where "a certain population did not constitute a 'people' entitled to
self-determination." Id.
34. See LEE C. BUCHHIET, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 20
(1978) ("It is impossible to know how many statements containing the phrase 'right to self
determination' were assumed by their authors to refer only to the process of decolonization and
would be significantly recast under the influence of secessionist proposals."). For an interesting
defense of self-determination based only on democratic principles, see Daniel Philpott, In
Defense of Self-Determination, in 105 ETHIcs 352 (1995).
35.

BUCHHIET, supra note 34, at 18-20.

36.
37.

U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2.
G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 8, at 121.
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authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves
in compliance with the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples as described above and thus possessed
of a government representing the whole people belonging to the
territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.
Various U.N. declarations make it clear that colonized people and those
who were subject to foreign invasion enjoy a right to external selfdetermination, but where, at the edges, self-determination justifies
secession or insurrection is, in the words of Captain Benjamin P. Dean,
"a continuin source of controversy within the international legal
community."
On an abstract level, any theory of self-determination which
encompasses an absolute right of secession based solely on democratic
principles must by necessity involve a fundamental denial of a right
existing within the nation-state to preserve its territorial integrity, at
least with respect to "peoples" within its own borders.4 0 It seems clear
that international norms do not go that far, but it is not clear how many
other factors must be present before a claim for secession based on selfdetermination will be considered legitimate. An examination of two
cases where self-determination has been invoked as a justification for a
secession movement and their outcomes may help to define the
parameters, or at least the ideological floor, of the current norms
regarding when the right to external self-determination may trump a
state's right to safeguard its territorial integrity. These cases
demonstrate that international norms encompass only, at a maximum, a
remedial right to secession after a base level of injustice has been
inflicted upon the seceding party. Moreover, because there have been
relatively few instances in which the international community has given
broad support to a secession movement, and usually even then only
post-facto, only a hazy notion of how extreme the violations must be to
give rise to a right of self-determination can be discerned.

38. Id.
39. Benjamin P. Dean, Self-Determination and U.S. Support of Insurgents: A PolicyAnalysis Model, 122 MIL. L. REV. 149, 151 (1988).
40.

See DAVID RAIC, STATEHOOD AND THE LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 310 (2002)

(discussing the shortcomings of such a "choice theory" of self-determination); see also Allen
Buchanan, Theories of Secession, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 30, 34-41 (1997) (distinguishing and
discussing the merits of two broad theories of secession).
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1. Bangladesh
The case of the independence of Bangladesh is something of a
perfect storm of justification and timing for a secession movement.
Between 1969 and 1971 the military government that ruled Pakistan
was increasingly under threat of losing power. Sheik Mujibur Rahman
spearheaded, through entirely peaceful and political means, attempts to
bring political parity to what was then East and West Pakistan.4 The
Elections in 1971 gave Rahman's Awami party a majority of seats in
what was to be the inaugural session of the National Assembly. 4 2 When
the date for the initial meeting of the National Assembly was postponed
indefinitely by the supposedly outgoing powers, the people of East
Bengal began to engage in large scale civil disobedience. 4 Within a
month, Pakistani troops engaged in a military campaign against East
Bengal, resulting in the slaughter of over one million Bengalis and the
displacement into India of another ten million people over the course of
the military campaign.4
On March 26, 1972, shortly after the beginning of the military
campaign, Bangladeshi independence was declared. 45 Even there,
however, the order declaring independence "made it clear that the
proclamation of independence was a last resort measure for
safeguarding the Bengali people." 46 After India intervened militarily,
the hostilities ceased and the international community quickly began to
recognize Bangladesh as an independent nation.4 7
In this situation just about every factor that could be considered a
legitimate ground for secession was present. The Bangladeshis
represented a minority group that was ethnically distinct, lived in a
geographical area that was easily divisible from the whole of Pakistan,
engaged in peaceful and democratic means of obtaining their political
objectives, and the Pakistani government repressed them by engaging in
human rights violations of the highest order.4 8 Even so, the fait
accompli nature of Bangladeshi independence as a result of the Indian
military intervention may have played a larger role in the international
community's recognition of the secession than the application or

41. RAIc, supra note 40, at 336-37.
42. Id. at 337.
43. Id. at 338.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 339. Recognition by the U.N. did not come until after 1974 because of political
opposition by China, but by May 1972 seventy nations had formally recognized Bangladesh. Id
at 339 n.106.
48. Id. at 340-41.
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adoption of any theory of legitimate secession. 49 At a minimum though,
we can at least say that the international community will recognize
secession as legitimate when all of these factors, including the political
ones, are present.
2. Quebec
The situation surrounding the request for an advisory opinion on the
contemplated secession of Quebec from Canada can fairly be taken to
represent the polar opposite of the situation in Bangladesh. In the wake
of the Quebec separatist party, Parti Quebecois, narrowly losing a
referendum on the question of whether or not Quebec should begin the
process of seceding from Canada, the Canadian Government requested
an advisory opinion from the Canadian Supreme Court on three issues. 50
Those issues were: (1) whether under the Constitution of Canada the
government of Quebec can secede from Canada unilaterally, (2)
whether international law provided Quebec a right to secede from
Canada unilaterally, and (3) which rule would trump if a conflict existed
between the international and constitutional regimes on the issue.5 1
There was no violence surrounding the movement, no human rights
violations inflicted upon the inhabitants of Quebec, and the Quebecois
were actively represented and engaged in the government of Canada
before, during, and after the referendum and opinion. 52 The position of
the Quebecois was that the willful, democratic expression of their desire
to sever ties with Canada was, standing alone, sufficient to confer upon
it a right of secession under either international or Canadian law. 53 The
decision issued by the Supreme Court of Canada, denying that Quebec
had a right of unilateral secession under either Canadian or international
law, thus rendering the third issue moot, has been significantly
influential on the international debate over the scope of external self49.

See BUCHHEIT, supra note 34, at 213 ("It is . . . difficult to know whether the

international community simply found it more dignified to accept the secession once Indian
intervention had made it inevitable; or whether its reaction really was a comment upon the
secession's intrinsic merits . . . . It may be a sufficient response for international jurists to say
that a claim invoking the right of self-determination obviously needs more than a sheer quantum
of human suffering for legitimacy.").
50. L. Kinvin Worth, Quebec, Canadaand the First Nations: The Problem of Secession,
23 VT. L. REv. 709, 709 (2009). For a more detailed discussion of the Quebec issue and
continuing issues surrounding Quebec's potential secession from Canada see generally Daniel
Turp, Quebec's Right to Secessionist Self-Determination: The Colliding Paths of Canada's
Clarity Act and Quebec's FundamentalRights Act, in SECESSION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 167
(Julie Dahlitz ed., 2003).
51. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at 2 (Can.).
52. See id. at 75.
53. Id. at 40-41.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012

11

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 5

594

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 24

determination. 54
In Reference re Secession of Quebec the Supreme Court of Canada
identified three possible scenarios where a people might have a ri ht to
external self-determination, or, in other words, a right to secede. The
court identified those instances as where a "people"-as that term is
understood in the U.N. Charter and other international law documents"is governed as part of a colonial empire"; "is subject to alien
subjugation, domination, or exploitation; and possibility where a 'a
people' is denied any meaningful exercise of its right to selfdetermination within the state of which it forms a part." The Court
found the first two cases to be inapplicable to Quebec 57 and went on to
say of the third that it was both unclear whether it was an international
law standard and even if established would only be applicable in
"exceptional circumstances," which amount to a "complete blockage"
of the oppressed people's right to participate in government.5 8
Quebec serves as a far edge example of whether a claim for external
self-determination is legitimate. There, even assuming such a right
could exist outside of the colonial or invasion context, the claim fell
before Canada's right of territorial integrity because no factors other
than a democratically expressed will of a "people" to secede were
present.
3. Synthesis?
From these two cases we can see that a mere democratic impulse is
not enough to justify a secession movement under current norms. Either
the "people" seeking to secede must be a colonial state under foreign
domination, or have been subject to significant hardships, perhaps even
genocides, before the right of external self-determination will accrue.
This is, of course, assuming that present norms would hold that any
such right can ever accrue in a non-colonial state. In the years since the
54. As an example of the influence of the decision, a Westlaw search for the phrase "2
S.C.R. 217" limited only to law reviews and other journals conducted on April 16, 2012
returned 402 articles, including at least six published within the last four months of the search
date.
55. Reference re Secession of Quebec, 2 S.C.R. 217, at 7.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 74.
58. Id. at 74-76. Interestingly, some of the amicus curiaeappear to have tried to argue a
Buchheit-like point, attempting to convince the high court that secession would become
legitimate post-facto because the international community would accept the facts on the ground.
Id. at 77. The court rejected this argument, correctly pointing out that the recognition of a state
by the international community and whether or not the creation of that state was accomplished
by a means sanctioned by international law are distinct questions, neither dictating the result of
the other. Id. at 77-78.
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Quebec and Bangladesh secession attempts, international law
developments show that whether such a right is recognized at all is still
very much open for debate. A Report of the InternationalFact-Finding
Commission on the Conflict in Georgia condemned the South Ossetian
and Abkhazian secessionist movements, basing the argument in the
report that, other than for "colonial peoples, and peoples subject to
foreign occupation," 59 international law does not permit secession. The
commission states:
Outside the colonial context, self-determination is basically
limited to internal self-determination. A right to external selfdetermination in form of a secession is not accepted in state
practice. A limited, condition extraordinary allowance to secede
as a last resort in extreme cases is debated in international legal
scholarship. However, most authors opine that such a remedial
"right" or allowance does not form a part of international law as
it stands.60
This position appears to have been somewhat persuasive, or at least
born out in state practice, as neither South Ossetia nor Abkhazia have
been recognized by the United Nations or by more than a handful of
other countries acting alone. 6 1 These developments may indicate a
movement away from the liberal norms, such as those expressed in the
mid- 1970s, toward a more stringent view. 62
B. What is a "People"?
The various U.N. documents acknowledging a right of selfdetermination do so not to any group, but specifically to "a people."
This distinction is more than academic. In Western Sahara the I.C.J.
specifically indicated that there were times that groups seeking
independence were not entitled to self-determination because they "did
59.

2 REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING COMMISSION ON THE CONFLICT IN

GEORGIA 136 (2009), availableat http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html [hereinafter REPORT].
60. Id. at 141.
61. WIKIPEDIA, International Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Internationalrecognition-of AbkhaziaandSouthOssetia (as of Apr. 17,
2012, 14:23 p.m. EST).
62. For example, Article VII of The Helsinki Accords states that "all peoples always have
the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external
political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political,
economic, social and cultural development." THE FINAL ACT OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY

AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE art. VII, 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975), available at http://wwwl.
umn.edu/humanrts/osce/basics/finact75.htm. That declaration is nigh impossible to square with
the position presently taken by the United States and most other world powers.
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not constitute a people." 63 The question is therefore an important one in
determining the validity under current norms of any secessionist
movement.
Although virtually every major human rights document mentions the
self determination of "peoples," for whatever reason none of those texts
(not even the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Peoples)64 has
explicitly defined the term. Perhaps the closest we can come by way of
definition is one by implication from the Principles Which Should
Guide Members in Determining Whether or not an Obligation Exists to
Transmit Information Calledfor Under Article 73e of the Charter.s
There, in determining when the Article 73 reporting obligations of
colonial states cease, Principle IV laid out that: "Primafacie there is an
obligation to transmit information in respect of a territory which is
geographically separate and is distinct ethnically and/or culturally from
the country administering it."6 6 It is these dependent states, whose
peoples have a right of external self-determination, to which reporting
obligations applied. As such, we can parse out that the "peoples"
entitled to self-determination must be in a geographically separate
territory from the colonial state and be ethnically or culturally distinct
from the "peoples" of the colonial state. That peoples should be defined
around ethnic and cultural grounds is not an unusual conclusion and
follows from the typical historical understanding of what a "people"
meant in the international law context. Pre-World War One, peoples
were typically "conceived of in ethnic terms."67 Later theories have
defined the issue territorially.6 8
No conception on how to define a people is without flaws and some
scholars have termed them "virtually insoluble." 69 The territoriality
notion is, conceptually, untenable, and self-collapsing. If the term
"peoples" is to be a limiting phrase as to who has a right to selfdetermination, defining them territoriality is simply to say "if you
claimed this geographic area, then you are a people." All secession
movements would then legitimately be able to claim that they are a
people, something that does not mesh with the I.C.J.'s comment in
Western Sahara and renders the repeated use of the phrase in
international documents as mere surplusage. The ethnic definition,
63.

Western Sahara,Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 33 (Oct. 16).

64.

See UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES (ALG, 1976), available at

http://www.algerie-tpp.org/tpp/en/declaration-algiers.htm.
65. G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 30.
66. Id. Ann. Principle IV.
67. MOORE, supra note 4, at 2.
68. Id. at 3.
69. Philpott, supra note 34, at 364 (discussing the position of Allen Buchanan in
SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM FORT SUMTER TO LITHUANIA AND

QUEBEC 49 (1991)).
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perhaps like any objective criterion based on the characteristics of the
peoples involved, is extremely difficult and perhaps impossible to state
conceptually. 70 However, on ethnic or cultural grounds it is possible to
use a subjective criterion to good end. Some theorists, like Daniel
Philpott, would accept a subjective self-referential definition of what it
means to be a people. Doing so, however, would collapse this criterion
into what is essentially the notion that if a group says they are a people
then they are a people,7 ' and I would reject such an approach for the
same reasons that a territory-based objective criterion is unhelpful.
However, we can subjectively identify that, as a floor, the secessionist
group must view themselves as both unified and ethnically or culturally
distinct from the rest of the nation from which they seek to secede to
qualify as a people.

IV. DID THE AMERICAN

COLONIES HAVE A RIGHT TO EXTERNAL
SELF-DETERMINATION UNDER PREVAILING NoRMs?

A. Pre-or Post-ColonizationContext?
It has probably not passed unnoticed that the foregoing discussion of
the possible parameters of international norms has limited itself to cases
that are, at least arguably, outside of the decolonization context. That is
no accident. There are at least two good reasons why the postcolonization/invasion context is more appropriate for the present
investigation. The first is simple: there was no decolonization regime at
the time of the American Revolution.
The second reason is more involved, but I believe ultimately makes
this examination more useful going forward. Simply put, it is
philosophically discordant to grant a unilateral right of secession to a
"people" if the ethnic people seeking secession are the descendants of
the colonizers themselves. The norm within the international
community that gives rise to an automatic right to external selfdetermination in colonized or subjugated peoples is based on the
inappropriateness and injustice of an indigenous people being placed at
the will of another group. The Declaration on the Grantin of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples makes this clear. It
states in perambulatory language:

70. Id.
71. Id. at 365 ("Why need we try [for an objective criterion] ... We simply
acknowledge, usually without difficulty, that a distinct group wants independence or greater
autonomy from a larger state.").
72. G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 7, at 66-67.
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Recognizing that the peoples of the world ardently desire the
end of colonialism in all its manifestations,
Convinced that the continued existence of colonialism
prevents the development of international economic cooperation,
impedes the social, cultural and economic development of
dependent peoples and militates against the United Nations ideal
of universal peace....
Solemnly proclaims the necessity of bringing to a speedy and
unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and
manifestations.7 3
To grant an automatic remedial right to the colonists would
essentially be to pervert this doctrine into one of freedom for satellite
states, rather than for colonized peoples.
This would, of course, potentially be different if the American
colonists and the indigenous tribes were united in a cause against the
British, potentially forming a new culturally mixed people seeking
mutual freedom, but that was not the case. The depth and complexity of
the relationship between the colonists, British, and the indigenous tribes
is beyond the scope of this Essay. It could, and has, filled volumes. 74 It
is sufficient to observe that tribes were on all sides of the American
Revolution and that the British sometimes sided with the tribes over the
colonists' demands to expand westward, particularly where a Britishtribal treaty was in place. This policy of the British was among the
grievances listed by the colonists as a justification for secession: "He
has excited domestic insurrections amongst us,"75 and "has endeavored
to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian
Savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished
destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions."56
To this day, numerous issues of shared sovereignty between the
United States and the indigenous peoples of the Americas persist. 7
Accordingly, the most appropriate lens with which to view the
American colonists' claims to a right to external self-determination is
one which treats them not as a colonized or occupied people, but as a
group which falls into the only potentially recognized third category of
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY
(1995); HoLToN, supra note 12.
75. This complaint is actually in reference to the offer of freedom for military service
made by Lord Dunsmore to slaves discussed supra. Rakove, supra note 14, at 94 n.27.
76. Id. at 95.
77. See generally David M. Schraver & David H. Tennant, Indian Tribal SovereigntyCurrentIssues, 75 ALB. L. REV. 133 (2012).
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legitimate secessionists: the oppressed.
B. Were the Colonists a "People"Distinctfrom the British?
Despite the perambulatory language in the U.S. Constitution7 and
the Declaration of Independence79 it is far from clear that the American
colonists would qualify as a "people" for purposes of establishing a
right to external self-determination under present norms. Under a
territorial definition of a "people," the colonists would certainly qualify.
The colonies were relatively defined territories and, under that standard,
the colonists' declaration of themselves as a people would be sufficient
under the analysis supra. However, under cultural or ethnic criteria,
subjective or objective, things become significantly less straightforward.
The interpretation of a "people" derived from the Principles Which
Should Guide Members in Determining Whether or not an Obligation
Exists to Transmit Information Called for Under Article 73e of the
Charter, calls for a "people" to have a "distinct" ethnic or cultural
background from the dominant state and demonstrating such distinction
between the colonists and the British is far from easy.80 Although the
Declaration of Independence lays out a substantial list of grievances, it
is worth noting that none of them address the kinds of grievances that
one would naturally expect from an oppressed people that are socially
and culturally distinct from the dominant group. None of the grievances
reference the repression of a specific religious persuasion in the
colonies. This is partly because the overwhelming majority of the
colonists were Christians of one stripe or another and partly because
religious freedoms in the colonies were in many cases more protected
than in England.8 ' None of the grievances identify particular cultural,
rather than economic or political, practices either. Indeed, perhaps the
most telling piece of information about whether the colonists were
indeed culturally or ethnically distinct from the British is a line from the
Speech to the Six Nations which the Continental Congress drafted to
send to the Mohawks, Oneidas, Tusscaroras, Onondagas, Cayugas, and
Senecas on July 13, 1775: "This is a family quarrel between us and Old
England." 8 2 I would hardly expect that any of the modem secessionist
78.
79.

U.S. CONsT. pmbl. ("we the people....").
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. I (U.S. 1776) ("When in the course of

human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have
connected them with another. . .").
80. G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 30, at 30.
81. For example, as early as 1665 the colonial government in New York had made
"[p]rovision ... for religious liberty for those 'who profess Christianity."' PETER J. GALIE,
ORDERED LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 18 (1996).
82. Speech to the Six Nations, in 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-

1799, at 177-83 (1905), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th-century/contcong 07-13-
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movements with indisputably distinct "peoples" would refer to their
struggles for independence as "a family quarrel."
A second concern with identifying the colonists as a "people" is the
criterion of self-regarding unity proposed supra. The colonists did not
consider themselves unified with the indigenous peoples of the colonies,
who were not arraigned throughout the colonies along strict and
consistent borders.83 This would trigger the kind of minority protection
problem that has concerned some courts 84 and theorists.8 5 Moreover, the
colonies themselves were only loosely knit at the time of the revolution.
For example, Vermont was not even recognized by the other colonies
and fledgling states until 1791, ironically on account of settlers in
portions of land in New York wishing to be part of Vermont instead but
Congress being unwilling to recognize the desires of the Vermonters
over the land claims of the New Yorkers.8 6
Because of the murk surrounding exactly what constitutes a "people"
it is entirely possible that under the current norms the American
colonists would not be considered to be a "people" entitled to rights of
external self-determination, regardless of whether the situation was
sufficiently extreme to warrant the remedy of secession.
C. Were the Colonists' GrievancesSufficiently Extreme?
The injuries suffered by the American Colonists fall into a gray area
between the bookends of Quebec and Bangladesh. The oppressions of
the British were certainly more severe than those faced by the people of
Quebec at the hands of Canada, but are a far cry from the atrocities
visited upon the people of Bangladesh by Pakistan. However, judging
the two as extremes, the problems facing the colonists were much closer
to Quebec than Bangladesh in degree, indicating that present state
practices may well find the justifications of the colonists lacking in the
modern context. A look at the two major areas of the colonists'
75.asp.
83. In fact, the very next sentences of the Speech to the Six Nations are: "You Indians are
not concerned in it. We don't wish you to take up the hatchet against the king's troops." Id.
84. See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at 48-50.
85. See Philpott,supra note 34, at 378-80.
86. Peter S. Onuf, State-Making in Revolutionary America: Independent Vermont as a
Case Study, 67 J. AM. HisT. 797, 797 (1981):
Because the United States Congress would not sanction the involuntary
division of one of its own members, Vermont was unable to gain recognition
from neighboring states or protection from the British in Canada. When
Vermont became independent, it became independent of all the world and
remained so until 1791 when it was finally admitted to the union.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol24/iss3/5

18

Woods: Inevident Truths; Why Current International Norms and Policies Ma

2012]

INEVIDENT TRUTHS: WHY CURRENTINTERNATIONAL

NORMS AND POLICIES MA YNOT

601

complaints will make this clear.
1. Violence Against the Colonists
Although six out of the twenty-seven paragraphs of the Declaration
allege acts of violence committed against the colonies or sought to be
protected by the English Crown, the scope of the violence pales when
compared to similar instances. The total number of estimated casualties,
on all sides including British soldiers and German mercenaries, of the
entire American Revolutionary War is under a hundred thousand lives.87
This is fewer than the contemporaneous smallpox epidemic that was
present in the colonies at the time and far fewer than the one million
estimated deaths in Bangladesh. Of course, those numbers account for
the entire war, which escalated significantly after the French joined in
1778, two years after the Declaration.
In the context of the time, the actions taken by George III prior to the
declaration-but after hostilities between the colonists and the British
had already broken out-were mild when compared with other sitting
European monarchs. 89 The most storied atrocity of the time was the
Boston Massacre, an event which cost only five lives and as a result of
which the soldiers involved were almost immediately taken into custody
and tried for murder. 90 This too pales in comparison to the estimated
one thousand deaths within the first twenty-four hours of the violence in
Bangladesh. 9 1 It should also be remembered that not all acts of violence
against a people will grant a right of external self-determination.
Legitimate peace keeping deaths or civil war casualties may not be
considered forms of oppression for purposes of reaching the high hurdle
required to give rise to a claim for legitimate secession; only acts of
genocide seem to potentially give rise to such a right in the modem
context. 92
87. American Revolutionary War, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_
RevolutionaryWar#Casualties (last visited Apr. 18, 2012).
88. Id.
89. JOHN BROOKE, KING GEORGE III 183 (1972). See also Rakove, supra note 14, at 92
n.24 (noting that George III was "hardly a tyrant by the brutal standards" of the time period).
90. See ZOBEL, supra note 2, at 180-205.
91. RAIc, supra note 40, at 339.
92. See REPORT, supra note 59, at 145 n.80:
The documentation provided by the Russian side to the IIFFMCG reported
many cases of maltreatment and killing. Nevertheless, these seem to be
incidents of violence typical for civil wars rather than systematic attempts to
destroy the South Ossetians as an ethnic group. . . . The situation was therefore
not fundamentally different from the situation of the Chechens in the Russian
Federation or the Kurds in Iraq where the international community did not
support a right to secession.").
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While obviously worse than Quebec, where there was no bloodshed,
the violence against the colonists was not close to the level in
Bangladesh. The fact that the colonists' grievances regarding violence
tow much closer to Quebec indicates that the international community
would be unlikely to find the violence sufficiently egregious to trigger a
legitimate right to secession.
2. Internal Self-Determination Violations
The bulk of the remaining grievances contained in the Declaration
can be grouped together under the heading of violations of the right to
internal self-determination. Broadly speaking they encompass claims
that the colonial legislatures were unequal in rights to the Parliament,
that they lacked other adequate democratic representation, that Britain
was economically exploiting the colonies, and that the judiciary system
and penal laws imposed by the Crown and Parliament were unjust.93
While these instances are all certainly above the level of Quebec, they
are still not a high enough level to justify secession in the modern
context.
Obviously, for those theorists that would allow secession on the
basis of the democratically expressed will of a people alone, there
would be more than enough evidence of the desire to form a separate
government by the colonies to justify it. However, that does not appear
to be the norm; the Quebec case, for example, requires much more and
it is an example of where accrual of the right to unilateral secession is
thought to be possible at all.
The near complete thwarting of the right to self-determination
required in such instances may not have been reached in the colonies.
Although the King repeatedly vetoed or ignored laws passed by the
colonial legislatures (a power which he did not possess with respect to
Parliament), limited the size and authority of those legislatures,
occasionally moved them, and reserved to Parliament the right to
legislate over and above those legislatures, it is not clear that even these
restrictions would amount to the kind of total denial that would meet
even the standard discussed by the Supreme Court of Canada. This is
because although restricted, the colonial governments did exercise
some, and in some cases significant, control over the laws in their
93. A grievance by grievance analysis is unnecessary as no one allegation of oppression,
except perhaps genocide, would seem to trigger a unilateral right to secession. For a point by
point break down of the historical facts behind each grievance listed in the Declaration, see
generally Rakove, supra note 14 (annotating each grievance listed with a footnote providing
historical context); materials located on the Founding.com website (providing, among other
primary sources, an annotated version of the Declaration using hyperlinks at http://www.
founding.com/the declaration of i/pagelD.2418/default.asp).
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respective colonies. For example the New York Assembly "[b]y the late
1730s had complete financial control, and was both willing and able to
defy governor's requests or threats as well as royal instructions."9 4 In
some cases, like New York, the colonial governing structure present in
the decades leading up to the revolution was not significantly different
from the ones ultimately adopted by the colonies after the Declaration
was issued. 95
One factor that would weigh in favor of a modern view granting a
right to secede to the American colonists is the passage of time itself.
Part of the justification for a very high bar to justify secession is that
"[t]he international community can react to extreme forms of oppression
in other ways than by granting a right to secession, e.g. by adopting
sanctions without questioning the territorial integrity of the oppressive
state." 96 That option was not present in the case of the American
colonists and if, for some reason a parallel situation should arise under
current norms (i.e., one where the international community's options are
to either declare a legitimate right to secession or to do nothing at all), it
may well be that international law would permit the act of secession.
Although the American colonists have a better case on the denial of
the right to self-determination side of things than on the violence side,
they are still very much in a gray area of international norms. A strict
reading of when situations are sufficiently extreme, which state actions
in the past ten to fifteen years seem to favor, may very well not consider
the complaints of the American colonists to have been sufficient.
VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis has made it clear that under the prevailing
norms, as best we can determine them, it is entirely possible, if not
likely, that the American Revolution would not be considered a justified
act of secession. Not only might the colonists not have qualified as a
"people" for purposes of international law, their grievances may not
have been sufficiently severe. For Americans, like this author, that
notion coupled with the knowledge that the United States plays an
extremely important role in the settling of international legal norms, is
disquieting. It indicates that the international norms currently in use
along both of those dimensions require a deeper reexamination by
Americans. This knowledge in hand, when evaluating whether a
secession movement in another part of the world is justified, Americans
should look to our own past rather than simply analyzing the current
94.

GAILE, supra note 81, at 27.

95.

See id. at 27-30.

96.

REPORT,supra note 59, at 138.
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norms as evinced by state practice and applying those norms in a
manner that best suits the present administration's foreign policy. If, as
a nation, we are unwilling to do so, we must instead be willing to accept
a level of hypocrisy in our foreign policy behavior that strikes to the
very core of what we profess to be our fundamental values as a nation.
We would need to admit that our self-evident truths were not so evident
after all; Jeremy Bentham was right. Personally, I would choose the
former.
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